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CONSCIOUSNESS & CULPABILITY 
Adam Candeub· 
INTRODUCTION 
The law holds, from jury instructions to rules of evidence, that a defen-
dant is criminally culpable if she "has" or "acts with" a culpable mental 
state. I This position is not quite accurate. Merely "having" or "acting with" 
a culpable intention is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for culpa-
bility. Rather, culpability requires that an actor must have consciousness of 
her criminal intention. Consider those who commit crimes in their sleep, 
under hypnosis, or while experiencing other dissociate mental states. If one 
were to ask a murderous somnambulist, "What are you doing?" she could 
respond in a dream-like voice "I'm killing my daughter" or upon awaking 
could recall her murderous intention. Such an actor has a criminal intention, 
at least under most definitions of intentional states, but would not be con-
victed of murder.2 
Although the law generally ignores the role of consciousness in mens 
rea, some case law recognizes the distinction between having a mental state 
and being conscious of it. Cases dealing with somnambulists, as well as 
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Yale College. The author is currently an 
attorney practicing law in Washington, D.C. I thank Professor Michael Moore for his insightful com-
ments on this Article. I thank Professor Stephen Morse, not only for his insightful comments, but his 
great kindness and support over the years, as well. Thanks as well to H. W. Candeub for her patient 
editing, and Jay Atkinson, Doug Golbi, and James Miller for their useful reviews. Above all, thanks to 
Julie Taibor for her love, constancy, and stickers. 
I. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 704(b) ("No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or 
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant 
did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a 
defense thereto."); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCfIONS: CRIMINAL § 2.02 (6th ed. 1996) ('The [specific 
intent] [or] [and] [mental state] with which an act is done may be shown by the circumstances surround-
ing the commission of the act .... unless the proved circumstances are not only ... consistent with the 
theory that the defendant had the required [specific intent] [or] [and] [mental state] .... "); FLORIDA 
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCfIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (4th ed. 2002) ("In order to convict of First Degree 
Felony Murder, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or 
intent to kill."). 
2. Law students are no doubt familiar with the famous English somnambulist who murdered her 
daughter. See Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders and North Koreans, 5 RES 
JUDICATAE 29 (1951) (discussing the unreported cases of The King v. Cogdon and Regina v. Carter, 
both involving somnambulistic homicide). The occurrence of somnambulistic crimes is not as freakish as 
it might first seem. Numerous American jurisdictions have had to deal with the issue. See Eunice A. 
Eichelberger, Annotation, Automatism or Unconsciousness as a Defense to Criminal Charge, 27 
A.L.RATH 1067 (1984) (collecting cases in which somnambulism was put forth as a defense). 
113 
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other unlikely defendants such as murderous hypnotics,3 somnambulistic 
assaulters,4 and hypoglycemic assaulters5 all recognize consciousness as a 
requirement for culpability and treat it as a separate element to be proven at 
trial. A lack of consciousness negates culpability, and whether one has con-
sciousness is simply a fact that is either present or not-just as one can be 
said to possess a mental state or not. This Article argues that these freakish 
cases reveal a basic, if usually unrecognized, criterion of mens rea-that 
mens rea requires consciousness of culpable mental state and that con-
sciousness is not necessarily coextensive with possessing a mental state. 
If, however, mens rea is redescribed as consciousness of a mental state, 
as opposed to possession of such state, a problem emerges. Unlike having a 
particular mental state, such as purpose or knowledge, consciousness is not 
a fact with a yes or no answer. Rather, it is a continuum: innumerable de-
sires, beliefs, and intentions sit on awareness's gray edge. It is not clear 
when culpable consciousness emerges along this continuum-as is the case 
with mental states, such as purpose, belief, or desire. In other words, if con-
sciousness is a continuum, and if consciousness is the sufficient and neces-
sary condition for culpability, there must be a rule to determine when a de-
fendant acts with culpable consciousness. 
This Article proposes that whether an actor's level of consciousness in-
curs culpability involves a moral judgment-a judgment that asks, given the 
circumstances, whether we can expect an actor to bring into her stream of 
consciousness her criminal intentions. This judgment is crucial for deter-
mining culpability because only an actor who can be expected to con-
sciously respond to reason can be morally and legally culpable.6 This judg-
ment (henceforth referred to as "culpable consciousness" or "consciousness-
c") demarcates the divide in consciousness's spectrum between those inten-
tions that are our own and for which we are culpable, and those that are not 
and for which we are not culpable. Consciousness-c, therefore, solves the 
problem of criminal hypnotics and somnambulists. Their actions may be 
intentional, but such actors cannot reasonably be expected to bring their 
criminal intentions into consciousness given the circumstances under which 
they act; therefore, they lack culpability. 
3. The Model Penal Code states that a voluntary act does not exist in cases of crimes performed 
under hypnosis. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (2)(c) (1985) (providing that conduct under hypnosis is 
not a voluntary act). Numerous state statutes build on this rule. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
626:2(II)(c) (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(32)(c) (1995); see generally Mary Christine Bon-
nema, Comment, Trance on Trial: An Exegesis of Hypnotism and Criminal Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1299 (1993) (discussing cases involving hypnotism as a defense). Whether actions performed 
under hypnosis are genuine actions is a question that has received important scholarly attention. See 
infra text accompanying notes 75-79. 
4. See State v. Connell, 493 S.E.2d 292 (N.C. 1997). 
5. See Mendenall v. Texas, 15 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Guillot, 22 P.3d 1266 
(Wash. 2001). 
6. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text; see generally R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSmlLITY 
AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994). 
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Beyond the admittedly peculiar cases of somnambulistic murderers, 
consciousness-c clarifies one of the criminal law's most intractable prob-
lems in mental state, the distinction between first- (premeditated) and sec-
ond-degree murder. Traditionally, the distinction has turned on whether the 
actor "premeditated"; the intention to commit murder must pass through her 
stream of consciousness. As one hornbook describes the process: 
It has been suggested that for premeditation the killer asks him-
self the question, "Shall I kill him?" The intent to kill aspect of the 
crime is found in the answer, "Yes, I sllall." The deliberation part of 
the crime requires a thought like, "Wait, what about the conse-
quences? Well, I'll do it anyway.,,7 
The second-degree murderer, on the other hand, clearly had the intention to 
kill. For example, if someone were to ask her, "What are you doing right 
. now?" she would answer, "Killing this guy." However, she does not pre-
meditate, neither speaking nor introspecting the phrase, "I'm killing this 
guy," or words to that effect, before she commits her act.8 
Judges and commentators have attacked the degree murder system for 
close to a century, and the Model Penal Code has simply abandoned it. 
However, it remains the law in some form in most states.9 The survival of 
the first- and second-degree murder distinction attests to the strength of the 
moral intuition that actors are more culpable for acts committed with 
heightened states of consciousness. 
Consciousness-c accommodates this intuition but breaks with the tradi-
tional first-degree murder formulation. Consciousness-c determines culpa-
bility not by premeditation, which is but one species of consciousness, but 
by the degree to which an actor can be expected to bring her intentions into 
her stream of consciousness and premeditate upon them. The ease with 
which actors can do so reflects their conscious responsiveness to reason, 
which is the hallmark of moral and legal responsibility. to An actor is guilty 
of first-degree murder if she, under the circumstances, should have been 
able to or would have been expected to premeditate upon her act. This ex-
pands first-degree murder to those cases in which we would reasonably ex-
pect an actor to introspect but, because of some malignancy or eccentricity 
of character, failed to do so. This expansion is justified on the grounds that 
premeditated intentions and those that can be easily brought into the stream 
7. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. Scon, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.7(a), at 643 nA (2d ed. 
1986). 
8. [d. § 7.7(e), at 648. 
9. Mathew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 146 (1999). 
10. See WALLACE, supra note 6, at 131. For similar analyses of responsibility in terms of reason-
responsiveness, see STUART HAMPSHIRE, FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL (1975), and SUSAN WOLF, 
FREEDOM WITHIN REASON (1990). 
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of consciousness can play equally powerful roles in influencing behavior 
and exerting, what Wallace calls, "reflective self-control."ll 
Consciousness-c saves the degree distinctions from the criticism that 
motivated the Model Penal Code to reject them: 
Crudely put, the judgment is that the person who plans ahead is 
worse than the person who kills on sudden impulse. This generali-
zation does not, however, survive analysis .... Prior reflection may 
reveal the uncertainties of a tortured conscience rather than excep-
tional depravity. The very fact of a long internal struggle may be 
evidence that the homicidal impulse was deeply aberrational and far 
more the product of extraordinary circumstances than a true reflec-
tion of the actor's normal character. 12 
Providing an illustration of a truly evil murder that would not qualify as 
first-degree is the famous hypothetical murderer, who walks by a child sit-
ting on the edge of a bridge and, without thinking, pushes the child off. 13 
Under consciousness-c, such a murderer would be culpable for first-degree 
murder because he should have been able to bring his murderous intentions 
into his stream of consciousness. 
By transforming the factual determination, "Did the defendant premedi-
tate?" into a normative question, "Would it be reasonable under the circum-
stances to expect an actor to premeditate or excuse an actor from premedi-
tating?" Consciousness-c also answers Benjamin Cardozo's famous criti-
cism that first-degree murder presents an evidentiary problem too fine for 
most jurors.14 The fineness resides in the ephemeral nature of introspection 
itself. Courts continue to create confusion in determining just how much 
premeditation is required for first-degree murder. 15 Consciousness-c, on the 
other hand, only requires that the jury determine that (i) the act was inten-
tional and (ii) it was performed under conditions in which one could expect 
the actor to call such intention into consciousness and, indeed, also to pre-
meditate. Consciousness-c, therefore, completely avoids the evidentiary 
morass of whether the defendant premeditated "enough." 
11. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 157. 
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary 127-28 (1985). 
13. 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883). 
14. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
15. States' efforts to refonn the degree murder system continue to create judicial confusion. See, 
e.g., Suzanne Mounts, Malice Aforethought in California: A History of Legislative Abdication and 
Judicial Vacillation, 33 V.S.P. L. REV. 313 (1999); Vicki W. Zeller, The Anomaly of a Murder: Not all 
First-Degree Murder Mens Rea States are Equal, 28 N.M. L. REV. 553 (1998); John R. Snowden, Sec-
ond Degree Murder, Malice, and Manslaughter in Nebraslw: New Juice for an Old Cup, 76 NEB. L. 
REV. 399 (1997), Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California's Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 517 
(1996). See generally Lee R. Russ, Modem Status of the Rules Requiring Malice "Aforethought," "Delib-
eration," or "Premeditation," as Elements of Murder in the First Degree, 18 A.L.R.4TH 961, 963 (1982) 
("Despite the criticism of legal commentators, many courts continue to speak in terms of malice 'afore-
thought,' 'premeditation,' 'deliberation,' and the like, in defining first-degree murder."). 
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Consciousness-c follows from the basic premise that moral or legal ob-
ligation only exists when individuals' actions "are susceptible to being in-
fluenced directly by reasons.,,16 Actors can be said to be directly influenced 
by intentions (or, more broadly speaking, "reasons") when those intentions 
can, with relative ease, be brought into the stream of consciousness. Actors 
are not directly influenced by culpable intentions that cannot be brought, or 
would be too difficult to bring, into their stream of consciousness. These 
actors-whether they be animals, young children, individuals acting quickly 
or under great stress, or those who, for whatever reason, cannot be expected 
to bring into consciousness the intentions under which they are acting-are 
less culpable, and in extreme cases like somnambulism, not culpable at all. 
This Article's argument proceeds in the following manner. First, the 
law's current treatment of consciousness is discussed. Part I shows that the 
case law treats consciousness as a separ:ate requirement for culpability, usu-
ally implicitly, but sometimes explicitly as in premeditated murder or som-
nambulistic murders, and that any legal theory which attempts to explain 
culpable mental states without consciousness is incomplete. Drawing on 
philosophical notions of personal identity and responsibility, in particular 
the work of R. Jay Wallace and Derek Parflt, this Article argues that this 
consciousness requirement is not arbitrary, but it proceeds from accepted 
theories about responsibility and personhood. 
Second, given that consciousness-the true criterion for culpability-
exists in a continuum, what line demarcates culpable consciousness? Seek-
ing to provide a rigorous answer, Part II draws on Ned Block's distinctions 
concerning consciousness and advances culpability consciousness ("con-
sciousness-c") as a moral judgment that asks, given the circumstances and 
human cognitive competence, is it reasonable for actors to access in con-
sciousness their culpable mental states? Part II puts forward the standard 
legal-philosophical explanation of mental states as propositional attitudes, 
provides an explanation of how we are conscious of propositional attitudes, 
and describes how consciousness-c fits into such a framework. 
Part ill shows how consciousness-c creates a more coherent scheme for 
distinguishing degrees of murder. Finally, Part IV compares consciousness-
c with another recently suggested clarification of the distinction between 
first- and second-degree murder. Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum argue 
that the law should make normative judgments not about actors' abilities to 
bring culpable intentions into consciousness-consciousness-c-but about 
actors' motivations and motivating emotions. Under this approach, juries 
would find, for instance, second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, 
rather than first-degree murder, if they approved of or sympathized with the 
motivations that prompted the defendant's actions. Consistent with these 
commentators' views, consciousness-c recognizes that the criminal law con-
tains hitherto under-recognized moral judgments, but contends that these 
16. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 13 1. 
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judgments are rightfully confined to whether actors can be expected to exert 
reflective control to follow a rule, in other words, consciousness-c. 
I. THE CONSCIOUSNESS REQUIREMENT 
AND ITS JUSTIFICATIONS 
The law recognizes consciousness as essential for culpability, yet does 
so by implication, rarely acknowledging it as a separate requirement. 17 For 
instance, the Model Penal Code holds an actor culpable if she "has" or "acts 
with" the intentional states of knowledge, belief, or purpose.18 Notice that 
explaining legal mental states in this manner does not require conscious-
ness. One can "have" knowledge or purpose without such knowledge or 
purpose ever entering consciousness. For instance, I believe the proposition, 
"I ate granola for breakfast today," even though I never once spoke or held a 
sentence ascribing such proposition in my stream of consciousness. None-
theless, I clearly have such a belief, and this belief is manifested in numer-
ous ways other than presence of a sentence denoting it within my stream of 
consciousness. For instance, should someone ask me "What did you have 
for breakfast?" I would answer "Granola." Having a belief about what I ate 
for breakfast does not require that I, in fact, think or meditate "I ate granola 
for breakfast today." 
Perhaps as a result of the failure to specify the role of consciousness, 
case law and legal theory have failed to put forward a consistent justifica-
tion for the consciousness requirement. 19 Instead, case law and commentary 
have produced scattered and inconsistent justifications. The following sec-
tion (i) reviews how case law treats consciousness, showing how case law 
generally requires consciousness for culpability but lacks any consistent 
justification; (ii) reviews a notable scholarly treatment of the matter; and 
(iii) concludes with a proposal for a coherent rationale for why conscious-
ness is necessary for culpability. 
Briefly put, Part I concludes that consciousness is required for a culpa-
ble mental state because culpability requires choice. We hold people re-
sponsible for "bodily movements insofar as they manifest a choice that is 
made by the agent.,,20 A true choice, in turn, requires that actors have inten-
tions, beliefs, desires, or "reasons [they can] grasp and accept" that mediate 
that choice.21 Only by grasping these reasons can we act because oj (or, in 
17. A crime is traditionally held to have three elements: the mental, intentional part (mens rea); the 
act ("actus reus"); and causation. See LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 7, § 3.1, at 193-94. 
18. LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 7, § 3.5, at 218-19. The Model Penal Code recognizes conscious-
ness as an element of its act requirement, not its mental state requirement. Id. § 3.2(c), at 197-98; see 
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(c) (1962). 
19. See discussion infra at Part I.A. 
20. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 132; see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, Acr & CRIME 113 (1993) [here-
inafter MOORE, ACT & CRIME) ("Acts are not plausibly identified with bodily movements simpliciter, 
but they should be identified with the complex event volitions-causing-movements."). 
21. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 132. 
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the case of a criminal, in spite of) a moral or legal obligation.22 In turn, we 
can only grasp and accept conscious reasons. Therefore, only conscious 
moral reasons can directly influence behavior, and only conscious immoral 
or illegal reasons can render actors culpable. 
A. Case Law: Justifying the Consciousness Requirement 
Case law in numerous situations-somnambulism,23 extreme physical 
injury,24 extreme physical distress,25 blackouts, unconsciousness,26 hypogly-
cemic comas, or epileptic fits27-has consistently required consciousness 
for culpability. The justifications that courts offer as to why consciousness 
serves to negate culpability are varied, and, as shown below, largely incor-
rect. 
Numerous courts claim that because the unconscious actor cannot 
"know the nature and quality" of his act,28 or lacks knowledge of the deed,29 
the unconscious actor lacks culpability. This justification does not withstand 
scrutiny. An actor under hypnosis can answer questions about his actions 
and give reasons for performing them. A somnambulist or an epileptic could 
conceivably do the same thing. Furthermore, a somnambulist could wake up 
and recall his action, thus having knowledge of his past somnambulistic acts 
almost identical to his knowledge of his past non-somnambulistic acts. It 
would seem that what these actors lack is not knowledge or comprehension 
but an ability to have such knowledge and comprehension with the right 
kind of consciousness. 
Other courts say that because unconscious acts are performed in the ab-
sence of will, or without a voluntary will or act, there is no culpability?O 
However, that observation begs the question of what con~titutes a "volun-
tary will," for the existence of voluntary will or free will in a universe gov-
erned by natural laws is, of course, a controversial claim.31 If moral respon-
22. [d. 
23. Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (Ky. App. 1879); Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147,149 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1925). 
24. People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394,402 (Cal. App. 1970); Read v. People, 205 P.2d 233, 234-
35 (Colo. 1949). 
25. People v. Wilson, 427 P.2d 820, 828-29 (Cal. 1967); People v. Lisnow, 151 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1978). 
26. Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351, 358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962). 
27. People v. Higgins, 159 N.E.2d 179, 187-91 (N.Y. 1959); see Murphy v. State, 209 S.E.2d 101 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974). 
28. State v. Mercer, 165 S.E.2d 328, 335 (N.C. 1969) (holding that one who is completely uncon-
scious when he commits an act otherwise punishable as a crime, cannot know the nature and quality 
thereof), rev'd on other grounds, 215 S.E.2d 348 (N.C. 1975); see also People v. Freeman, 142 P.2d 
435,439 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); People v. Egnor, 67 N.E. 906, 908 (N.Y. 1903). 
29. Higgins, 159 N.E.2d at 184 (holding that an unconscious epileptic did not "know the nature and 
quality of his act," reversing the conviction, and ordering a new trial); Cooley v. Commonwealth, 459 
S.W.2d 89, 92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970). 
30. Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28,40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); State v. Connell, 493 S.E.2d 292 
(N.c. Ct. App. 1997); Fulcher v. State, 633 P.2d 142, 144 (Wyo. 1981) (describing an unconscious 
person as lacking "willful control over his actions"). 
31. See DANIEL C. DENNETI, ELBOW ROOM 26-34 (1984) (describing the arguments that acting 
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sibility required a will free from natural law, then arguably there would be 
no responsibility at all. Since the time of the Stoics, philosophers have rea-
soned that if human beings are part of the physical world, and the physical 
world is controlled by laws of cause and effect, free will has no place. Den-
nett, quoting Lucretius, puts the point nicely: 
Again, if all movement is always interconnected, the new arising 
from the old in a determinate order-if the atoms never swerve so 
as to originate some new movement that will snap the bonds of fate, 
the everlasting sequence of cause and effect-what is the source of 
the free will possessed by living things throughout the earth? 32 
Advocates of free will, like Immanuel Kant (to pick a famous one), argue 
that some human action-action that is motivated by reason-is immune 
from the interconnected movement of the natural laws that determine the 
behavior of matter.33 Thus, Kant concluded that moral responsibility re-
quires that one have "transcendental" freedom of the will, an absolute spon-
taneity that is immune to, or transcends, naturallaws.34 
Regardless of how one comes out on the great debate concerning free 
will, there is no reason to believe that free will and consciousness are neces-
sarily linked. If free will exists at all, why would it only exist in conscious 
mental activities but not in our unconscious mental activities? If the human 
will possesses a transcendental faculty to choose, totally free from physical 
causation-to use Kant's image of a rational wile5-why should that capac-
ity only exist in consciousness? It seems possible that a hypnotic or epilep-
tic individual's actions could be caused by the transcendental free will. 
Similarly, if we follow Freud and believe in the existence of unconscious 
desires and intentions,36 there is no reason to believe that such desires and 
intentions could not be chosen independently from physical causation. 
Still other courts state that unconscious individuals cannot form inten-
tions.37 This is not true. Since at least the time of Freud, it has been recog-
nized that desires, beliefs, and intentions may be repressed into the uncon-
because of reasons, as nonphysical things, is incompatible with a universe determined by natural law) 
[hereinafter, DENNETI, ELBOW ROOM]. 
32. [d. at 1-2 (quoting LUCRETIUS, THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, II, lines 250-255 (Latham 
trans., 1951». 
33. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 464-67 (Norman K. Smith, trans., SI. Martin's 
Press 1964) (1781). 
34. [d. at 465-66. 
35. [d. at 473-78. 
36. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 463 (A.A. Brill trans., Random House 
1950). 
37. See, e.g., People v. Saille, 820 P.2d 588, 599 (Cal. 1991) ("If you find that the defendant killed 
while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication and therefore did not form a specific intent to kill 
or did not harbor malice aforethought, his killing is involuntary manslaughter."); Huffman v. State, 217 
P. 1070, 1072 (Okla. Crim. App. 1923) ("When one takes the property of another, to make it larceny, a 
felonious intent must be shown, and while this may be inferred from the character of the taking, the 
defendant may show that he was unconscious of what he was doing at the time, or too drunk to form or 
have any felonious intent."). 
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scious.38 The process of psychoanalysis "brings to the surface"-brings to 
consciousness-those mental states that the Freudian analyst would argue 
exist and influence behavior. Moreover, it would appear that sleepwalking 
or hypnotic individuals have intentions. They act in goal-directed behaviors 
that seem, like any other behaviors, to be caused by beliefs, desires, and 
intentions.39 If a sleepwalker, hypnotic, or epileptic recalls acting upon an 
intention while unconscious, such an intention is indistinguishable from any 
other remembered intention. Finally, as discussed below, functionalism, the 
generally accepted theory of mind, conceives of beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions as propositional attitudes encoded in the brain like lines in a com-
puter.40 Like so much code in a CPU, beliefs, desires, and intentions in a 
brain can exist under functionalism without consciousness of such mental 
states.41 
Still other courts speak of unconsciousness as a form of insanity.42 
Again, this cannot be the answer. The famous, "M'Naghten test," which 
remains law in over one-half of United States jurisdictions, states that the 
actor must (i) have a defect of reason caused by "a disease of the mind" and 
(ii) this defect must cause the actor not to realize the nature and quality of 
the act, or that the act was wrong.43 Somnambulists may not have the same 
mental capacities as the awake, but they do not suffer from mental illness.44 
Even assuming somnambulists, the hypoglycemic comatose, or hypnotics 
have some sort of "disease of the mind," they can tell the nature of their 
acts.45 They can answer questions about the nature of their actions, remem-
ber their intentions, and probably, per the M'Naghten test, could tell the 
difference between right and wrong. Indeed, it is claimed that hypnotics 
cannot act in a manner contrary to their moral beliefs, though they are 
highly suggestible in other ways.46 In short, people in trances or uncon-
scious states do not necessarily lack the ability to tell right from wrong or to 
38. See generally FREUD, supra note 36 (discussing Freud's theory of dream interpretation). 
39. See generally DANIEL C. DENNETI, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1987) (arguing that intentional-
ity is a property that emerges when looking at a cognitive system with a certain perspective). 
40. See infra text accompanying note 60 for a fuller description. 
41. The standard argument that functionalism "cannot handle" consciousness is the "absent qualia" 
argument-"given any functionally specified organizational structure, it is always possible (at least in 
principle) to construct realizations of that structure which we have every reason to believe possess no 
qualia." Robert Van Gulick, Understanding the Phenomenal Mind, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 435, 435 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). In other words, because functionalism 
envisions brain function as analogous to a computer, functionalism cannot explain why brains need 
consciousness, just as computers do not need consciousness to do what they do. 
42. McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Ky. 1994) (''The instruction given by the 
court exculpated the defendant if the jury believed he was 'temporarily insane at the time' or 'so intoxi-
cated that he did not form the intention to commit the offense or offenses. "'); March v. State, 734 P.2d 
231 (N.M. 1987) (citation omitted); State v. Wilson, 514 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1973); People v. Higgins, 159 
N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1959); Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1925); State v. Painter, 
63 S.E.2d 86 (W. Va. 1950). 
43. LAFAVE & SCOTI, supra note 7, § 4.2, at 438 (citing M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 
(1843». 
44. See MOORE, ACT & CRIME, supra note 20, at 248-62. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
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understand the nature of their actions. Whatever they are, they are not in-
sane. 
Finally, some courts speak: of unconscious actors lacking "choice."47 As 
discussed in Part III infra, this Article argues that these courts are by and 
large correct. 
B. Legal Theory 
Theorists, as well as courts, find that consciousness is necessary for 
CUlpability. Several papers given at a University of Pennsylvania lAw Re-
view symposium on Michael Moore's Act and Crime demonstrate that any 
legal theory of culpability must explain how consciousness affects culpabil-
ity.48 
In Act and Crime,49 and later in Placing Blame,5o Moore presents a 
magisterial philosophical analysis of criminal law, probably the most sig-
nificant of his generation. As Moore of course realizes, one of the key prob-
lems lurking in any such analysis is the mind-body problem, a perennial 
problem in Western philosophy since Descartes.51 Briefly put, this philoso-
phical problem asks how the brain, which is physical, can be the cause and 
locus of thoughts, desires, beliefs, and other intentional states, which are 
clearly not physical.52 If the laws of physics and chemistry determine how 
physical things cause other physical things to occur, how can we explain how 
physical things can cause thoughts--or even more puzzling, how can non-
physical things, like beliefs and desires, cause things in the physical worldr3 
Thoughts, desires, and beliefs are particularly puzzling, not simply because 
they are nonphysical, but because, as the philosophers would say, they are 
intentional-they have objects.54 One can "imagine a sphinx, remember the 
dead, and hope for a cure to the common cold, none of which objects exist-at 
least in the ordinary way.,,55 Similarly, criminal mental states have objects. A 
murderer can intend to poison Aunt Bea. Thus, "poison Aunt Bea" is the ob-
ject of his intent. Such objects, at least until the crime is committed, also lack 
existence at least in the ordinary way. 
47. People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 297 (Cal. 1992) (holding that an unconscious actor lacked 
volition when he stabbed prison guard to death); State v. LaFreniere, 621 N.E.2d 812, 818-19 (Ohio 
1993) (holding that the trial court should have instructed the jury on blackout when the defendant testi-
fied that "everything just went out for a second" and that he could not remember anything for a few 
minutes, and noting that state law exempts from criminal liability involuntary acts "that are not other-
wise a product of the actor's volition"). 
48. See Symposium, Act & Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1443 (1994). 
49. MOORE, ACT & CRIME, supra note 20. 
50. MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997) [hereinafter MOORE, PLACING BLAMEJ. 
51. Id. at 420-44. Most philosophers and historians credit Descartes with first recognizing the mind-
body problem. GUven GUzeldere, Introduction: The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide, in 
THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES I, 12 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1999) (stating 
"it is generally agreed that Descartes gave the mind-body problem its modern formulation"). 
52. MOORE, PLACING BLAME at 420-44. 
53. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM, supra note 31, at 32-34. 
54. See JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY (1983). 
55. D.C. DENNETT, CONTENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS 21 (1969) [hereinafter, DENNETT, CONTENTJ. 
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The mind-body problem is a problem not just for philosophy, but for the 
criminal law, as well. The mental state terms of the criminal law have non-
physical objects. For instance, criminal actors must intend with a particular 
object-an as yet unperformed criminal act. Everyday juries distinguish 
among these nonphysical objects. For example, Mr. Y's purpose to murder 
Mr. X and Mr. Y's purpose to defend himself from Mr. X's attack are exam-
ples of two propositional attitudes distinguished from one another by their 
objects. Whether the jury determines the existence of one or the other of 
these propositional attitudes makes a big difference, particularly to Mr. Y. 
Nevertheless, the objects of mental states do not exist in any ordinary way. 
They are not physically identifiable entities. Courts, however, think that the 
facts that they find are largely about physical, scientifically understood real-
ity.56 
To solve this mind-body problem of legal mental state, Moore adopts 
functionalism, the mainstream, orthodox solution to the problem. 57 While 
arguably one of the great achievements of twentieth century analytic phi-
losophy, functionalism is not a walk in the park to explain, and this Article 
will give the reader only a metaphorical description and point to places 
where more capable authors have done a better job.58 The only point in the 
excursus is to show that whatever success functionalism has in explaining 
mental states, it has little success in explaining consciousness and, therefore, 
cannot succeed in explaining legal mental states. 
To start with functionalism, consider the calculator in your pocket. How 
does it calculate 2+2? There is no little silicon man in your calculator who 
knows arithmetic. Rather, the calculator has programmed certain relation-
ships among symbols, namely the symbols "2," "+," and "4" (or, to be a bit 
more precise, the binary code equivalents of these symbols). Even though 
the calculator has no idea what the number 2 is, it knows (or is so pro-
grammed that) whenever it receives the symbols "2," "+," and "2," it shows 
"4" on its screen. The calculator does not know anything about arithmetic, 
mathematical concepts, or meanings; it merely "knows" how to manipulate 
symbols or syntactic representations. 
By analogy, the functionalist believes that intentions, beliefs, and de-
sires can be equated to symbols or syntactic representations-symbols that 
56. Rules concerning the admissibility of expert evidence best show the empirical outlook of United 
States courts in their factual determinations. As the Supreme Court has concluded, expert scientific 
evidence is only admissible if it is firmly based in empirical inquiry. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1995) (citing CARL G. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 
(1966) (stating that "a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is 
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested"». 
That the Court identifies empirical, verifiable knowledge as authority that "assist[s) the trier of fact," 
FED. R. EVID. 702, indicates that, at least in the Court's view, facts are claims about the physical world. 
57. MOORE, ACT & CRIME, supra note 20 at 131; JOHN SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF MIND 7 
(1992) [hereinafter SEARLE, REDISCOVERY) (stating that functionalism is the "modern orthodoxy"). 
58. See Ned Block, Troubles with Functionalism, in 1 READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
268 (Ned Block ed., 1980); GEORGES REY, CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: A CONTENTIOUSLY 
CLASSICAL APPROACH 305-07 (1996). 
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are functional neural structures in the brain. 59 These symbols mirror the 
laws of human psychology just as a calculator mirrors the laws 'of arithme-
tic. Furthermore, these symbols are causally and computationally related to 
one another and to sensory inputs and behavioral outputs, just as a calcula-
tor relates computation inputs to outputs according to the laws of arithme-
tic.6o To adopt an incredibly crude metaphor, just as a "2," a "+," and a "2" 
makes the calculator display a "4" on the screen (its behavioral output), the 
functional neural structure for the belief, "Putting arsenic in this tea will kill 
Aunt Bea," and the functional neural structure for the desire, "I want to kill 
Aunt Bea," produces the action (or behavioral output) of pouring a vial of 
arsenic into a cup a tea. 
Searle has a nice description of the process: 
Suppose that John has the belief that p, and that this is caused by his 
perception that p; and, together with his desire that q, the belief that 
p causes his action a. Because we are defining beliefs in terms of 
their causal relations, we can eliminate the explicit use of the word 
"belief' in the previous sentence, and simply say that there is a 
something that stands in such-and-such causal relations.61 
Notice that functionalism essentially understands human minds as com-
puters, and computers are not conscious.62 Most functionalist descriptions of 
mental state do not require or include a robust notion of consciousness.63 
This disconnect between functionalist accounts of mind and consciousness 
creates challenges for legal scholars relying on functionalism. Moore, of 
course, has always realized that in order to provide a theory of mind usable 
by the law, a functionalist account must also include an account of con-
sciousness.64 In Law and Psychiatry, he tackles, inter alia, the question of 
which Freudian functional states could feasibly render an actor legally re-
sponsible.65 Moore argues that only those states that are potentially con-
scious render an actor legally responsible.66 Yet the consciousness require-
ment must continually be grafted onto the functionalist account, and this 
move raises questions. 
Consider Moore's description of human action in Act and Crime.67 Ac-
cording to Moore, every actus reus can be analyzed as basic acts that consist 
59. It should be noted, as Hubert Dreyfus pointed out nearly a quarter of a century ago, that no one 
has the foggiest notion of what these neural structures might be, and they remain somewhat near science 
fiction. HUBERT DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T Do 159-63 (1972). 
60. REY, supra note 58, at 167-69. 
61. SEARLE, REDISCOVERY, supra note 57, at 41. 
62. MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 129-32 (1984) [here-
inafter MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY). 
63. [d. at 147-48. 
64. MOORE, ACT & CRIME, supra note 20, at 131-132. 
65. MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY, supra note 62, at 268-72. 
66. [d. at 341-43. 
67. MOORE, ACT & CRIME, supra note 20, at 136. 
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of voluntary bodily movements.68 A volition causes each voluntary action, 
and a volition is the executory command for a basic physical action.69 Both 
Professor Bernard Williams and Professor Stephen Morse criticize Moore's 
functionalist account of action in their articles, The Actus Reus of Dr. Cali-
gari and Culpability and Control, respectively.7o Williams puts forth the 
example of Cesare, the zombie from Robert Wiene's famous Weimar-era 
film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari.71 Dr. Caligari commands Cesare to kill 
the town clerk.72 Williams asks, "Suppose Caligari [Cesare's evil master] 
had said 'You agree to do itT and Cesare, in his somnambulistic state, had 
said 'Yes, I agree to do it.'" Does this consist of an action? Is Cesare guilty 
of murder?73 Under Moore's functionalist view, it is not clear who possesses 
the volition to kill or, to speak more colloquially, who performed the ac-
tion.74 One could argue that Cesare does, for when he assents, he must have 
some mental attitude that expresses the proposition "stab the town clerk." 
Yet, due to his state (that of being a zombie), one hesitates to throw poor 
Cesare in jail. 75 
Professor Morse presents the question more broadly. He asks whether 
dissociate states such as "highway hypnosis," sleepwalking, depersonaliza-
tion, or intense rage should "be understood as negations of a voluntary act 
or as affirmative defenses that excuse?,,76 He observes that "[t]here is no 
reason to believe that unconscious agents might not recapture their general 
intentions if exposed to various forms of psychological methods.,,77 Thus, 
such "unconscious acts" are arguably acts under Moore's functionalist ac-
count. 
Moore responds that sleepwalkers lack true, full-blooded volitions but 
have "volition-like states [that] execute certain of our background states of 
desire, belief, and general intention.,,78 He hypothesizes, therefore, that 
sleepwalkers and their ilk do not perform actions "because they ... [lack] 
appropriate intentions or volitions.,,79 This is arguably a metaphysical ex-
travagance. While philosophers, computer scientists, and psychologists can 
debate the matter, no one is close to proving the existence of any functional 
structures, like volitions, in the brain-let alone their poor relations, 
Moore's "volition-like" states. It seems somewhat ill-advised to expect ju-
ries to find such entities, for which no proof exists, and even worse, which 
68. [d. at 131. 
69. [d. at 142. 
70. Stephen Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1588-90 (1994); Bernard 
Williams, The Actus Reus of Dr. Calgari, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1661 (1994). 
71. Williams, supra note 70, at 1670. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. at 1671. 
74. [d. at 1670. 
75. ld. 
76. Morse, supra note 70, at 1641. 
77. [d. at 1651. 
78. Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1749, 1812 (1994). 
79. MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 49, at 300. 
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have no equivalent in the everyday psychology that juries and lay-people 
reply upon to understand behavior. 
In the alternative, deviating from orthodox functionalist doctrine, Moore 
distinguishes those intentions we have from those we do not by an appeal to 
consciousness. "Some substantial amount of one's desires and intentions 
must be accessible to an actor before he can be said to resolve the conflict 
between them with a volition.,,80 There are mental states that are just like 
volitions, but not "of the whole person," and therefore, do not make the 
whole person liable. Only conscious states make the "whole person" liable. 
As Moore realizes, a functionalist account of legal mental state alone is 
insufficient. He, along with the vast majority of courts, agrees that con-
sciousness is required. Therefore, even the most sophisticated functional 
analyses of legal mental state require consciousness. 
c. Why Consciousness? 
Case law and legal scholarship conclude that consciousness is the essen-
tial mental component of culpability. This Part argues that we are culpable 
only for beliefs, desires, and intentions of which we are conscious for two 
reasons: personal identity and moral choice. 
John Locke says, "Consciousness makes personal identity.,,81 As Locke 
explains, "consciousness . . . unites existences and actions, very remote in 
time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of 
the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness 
of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong."s2 
Because consciousness determines those intentions that belong to a person, 
it also defines those intentions for which an actor is culpable. 
Yet consciousness cannot be the sole determinant of which desires, be-
liefs, and intentions belong to an actor. Though accepting the centrality of 
consciousness in personal identity, Derek Parfit points out that people forget 
most of the actions they perform, as well as the beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions prompting such actions.83 Parfit asks whether you remember putting 
on your shirt this morning; presuming that you do not, he concludes that 
remembering actions or intentions in consciousness cannot be the sole de-
terminant of which actions and beliefs belong to you, though he admits that 
we would be "reluctant" to punish an actor for a crime she does not remem-
ber comrnitting.84 
Putting aside the question of whether amnesiacs are responsible for 
crimes they cannot remember comrnitting,85 Parfit is clearly correct in hold-
80. [d. at 307. 
81. JOHN LoCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 467 (Books for Libraries 
Press 1969) (1689). 
82. [d. at 473. 
83. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS & PERSONS 205 (1984). 
84. [d. at 82. 
85. Locke flatly says that actors cannot be criminally responsible for the crimes they forget. LoCKE, 
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ing that we are certainly not conscious-certainly not over time-of all 
those beliefs, desires, and intentions that we would call our own and for 
which we would bear responsibility. Indeed, very few of our desires, beliefs, 
and intentions are ever present in the stream of consciousness, particularly 
at the time they are performed. If this is the case, then why do courts and 
legal theorists-as well as our own moral intuitions-recoil at holding 
sleepwalkers culpable? After all, if we do not require consciousness of all 
those beliefs, desires, and intentions to be responsible, consciousness should 
not matter. 
The reason why consciousness matters rests in the intersection of our 
notions of moral responsibility and personhood. Agents are morally respon-
sible to the degree to which their behavior responds to reasons that they can 
grasp and understand. Moral actors act or refrain from acting because of a 
moral or legal requirement. Actors who cannot respond to reasons because 
they cannot grasp and understand them, like children or hypnotics, cannot 
be culpable. Because the ability to grasp and understand the reasons under 
which we act generally requires consciousness, consciousness emerges as 
the mental requirement of moral and legal responsibility. 
To expand upon this argument, consider this account of why people are 
responsible. Since Kant, at least, people have struggled to account for moral 
responsibility in a world determined by natural laws. After all, if my behav-
ior-say to kill my tennis opponent who happens to be beating me-is de-
termined by natural laws, just as a rock's behavior accelerating to the 
ground is determined by Newtonian physics, why should I be responsible? 
No one would hold the rock responsible if it were to hit someone in the head 
and kill him. Similarly, because laws of nature have determined the murder 
of my tennis opponent, I had no control and thus, no responsibility. 
One answer would be that human beings have souls or some sort of 
nonphysical "mind stuff' that is somehow exempt from the laws of nature 
and somehow permits individuals to make choices independently from the 
mechanist laws of nature. Thus, souls freely choose and can be held ac-
countable for those free choices. Without taking sides on the metaphysical 
question of free will, this Article only suggests that if souls determine hu-
man action, then consciousness would be the paramount criterion for moral 
responsibility. As Descartes realized, the soul, or some other "mind stuff," 
only exists as it is thought.86 Therefore, mental states only exist if they are 
thought. My belief that "I like ice cream" exists only as I think, "I like ice 
supra note 80, at 475. Partit rejects this argument on the ground that we lack a specific memory of most 
acts we perform; but, even he concedes that it would be unfair to hold actors responsible for actions that 
they completely forget. The relationship between responsibility and identity over time is explored in 
Adam Candeub, Cognition and Excuse (Sept. 15,2(02) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
86. Descartes pointedly says, "no thought can exist in us of which we are not conscious at the very 
moment it exists in us." David M. Rosenthal, A Theory of Consciousness. in THE NATURE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 729, 747 n.2 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). 
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cream." Arguably, under a Cartesian or dualist system, only premeditated 
murder would be intentional murder.87 
Given the preference of United States courts to ground factual determi-
nations in scientific, empirical knowledge,88 we will not speculate about 
souls or Cartesian res cogitans. It seems more helpful--or at least more 
persuasive to a larger number of academics-to describe responsibility in 
more material terms. Drawing on a long tradition of moral philosophy in 
this century that attempts to reconcile the mechanistic universe with moral 
responsibility, R. Jay Wallace proposes that actors are responsible, not when 
they exercise some power of the soul, but rather when they possess the 
"psychological competence" to grasp and respond to moral reasons.89 
Therefore, the rock falling to the ground and hitting a poor bystander is not 
morally responsible because it has no ability to change its course if one 
were to shout, "0 little rock, 0 little rock, don't hit that poor man's head! 
Don't you realize it would violate the categorical imperative?" However, a 
person throwing such a rock would conceivably have the power to change 
his action by exercising moral reasoning. By dint of that ability and his abil-
ity to consciously grasp the meaning of his actions, he would be morally 
responsible. 
Wallace expands his discussion to include the following conditions for 
moral responsibility: actors are morally responsible when they have "(1) the 
power to grasp and apply moral reasons, and (2) the power to control or 
regulate [their] behavior by the light of such reasons.,,90 Notice how con-
sciousness plays a role in both of these conditions. Unconscious actors do 
not grasp and apply their own reasons. Consider Raymond in the movie The 
Manchurian Candidate.91 Raymond had been trained to enter into a hyp-
notic trance upon hearing the cue, "Raymond, shall we play some soli-
taire.,,92 While in that state, he was highly suggestible and performed all 
sorts of horrible acts under the direction of his sinister mother, played by 
Angela Lansbury.93 Raymond certainly "responded to reasons." He did 
things, like conspire to assassinate a presidential candidate, because he was 
part of his mother's Communist plot to seize power.94 However, her reasons 
were not his. One would not say that he was culpable for performing these 
evil actions because he lacked consciousness of the reasons. For his reasons 
87. In modern times, John Searle, one of the most prominent defenders of anti-reductionism, relies 
on consciousness as a condition for an actor to possess a mental state. SEARLE, REDISCOVERY, supra 
note 57, at 84 ("In one way or another, all ... mental notions such as intentionality, subjectivity, mental 
causation, intelligence, can only be fully understood as mental by way of their relationship to conscious-
ness."). 
88. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
89. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 156-58. 
90. [d. at 157. 
91. THE MANCHURIAN CANDIDATE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1962). 
92. [d. 
93. /d. 
94. [d. 
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to be applied, he would have to consciously grasp the meaning of his ac-
tions. 
Therefore, expanding Wallace's conditions for moral responsibility, it 
appears that consciousness is essential because it has the unique power of 
being a focus of all of our beliefs and desires. It is, as Bernard Baars calls it, 
a "universal workspace" in which desires and beliefs, particularly the ac-
tor's moral desires and beliefs, can interact and affect action.95 Or, as Wal-
lace states, "[ w ] hat is distinctive about hypnotism is that the desire on which 
the agent acts becomes effective in a way that disables the agent's powers of 
reflective self-control ... [they are] disengaged at the moment when the 
hypnotic suggestion becomes effective.,,96 Without consciousness, Ray-
mond lost the ability to regulate his behavior in light of his own beliefs and 
desires. When he acted by reason of others' beliefs and desires, he could not 
be culpable for such acts. 
II. CONSCIOUSNESS-C: AN EXPLICA nON 
So far the discussion has shown that (1) consciousness is necessary for 
criminal culpability and (2) this consciousness requirement is not some 
fluke in the law but proceeds from basic moral considerations. Unspecified 
is (3) what the actor must be conscious of to be criminally (and morally) 
culpable and what type of consciousness is required. Consider the difficul-
ties these questions pose. A somnambulist murders her daughter. Though 
clearly asleep when committing the murder, she remembers, upon waking, 
the action and her premeditation prior to the act. Does she not possess cul-
pable consciousness upon remembering the action? Or, consider the actor in 
a hypoglycemic or drug-induced trance. He knows that he is in such a trance 
and knows that it "slows" his mental processes; however, if he really con-
centrates, he can grasp and understand what he is doing. Does such an actor 
possess intentions for which he can be held culpable? Further, of what must 
the actor be conscious?.Gn a less fantastic level, consider the second-degree 
murderer. She murders on impulse, coolly doing her business without pre-
meditation. She is conscious of her intentions but they are not in her stream 
of consciousness. Why is she less culpable than the premeditating mur-
derer? 
To answer these questions, we must first have some understanding of 
mental state and consciousness. With these understandings, we can more 
clearly define what type of consciousness is required for culpability-
culpability consciousness. The following Part includes a somewhat techni-
cal discussion, and those not interested in philosophy of mind or cognitive 
science could probably skim it. 
95. Bernard J. Baars, Contrastive Phenomenology, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: 
PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 187, 189 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). 
96. WALLACE, supra note 6, at 175. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Ala. L. Rev. 130 2002-2003
130 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 54:1:113 
A. Mental States as Propositional Attitudes 
Lafave and Scott state that mens rea is simply "the mental aspect[]" of 
a crime.97 Mental states need no further analysis because we all know what 
they are. Like Justice Potter Stewart and pornography, we know it when we 
see it.98 Cognitive scientists and philosophers have a (slightly condescend-
ing) name for this approach: "folk psychology," which is defined as "our 
everyday conceptual scheme for accounting for our own and others' actions 
in terms of beliefs, desires, emotion, and motives ... that employ ... refer-
ences to contentful and causally efficacious psychological states.,,99 
In other words, legal mental states simply employ the everyday terms 
we use to describe human behavior. Consider the Model Penal Code's three 
mental state terms: purpose, knowledge, and recklessness. loo We all know 
what it means for someone to have a purpose or to know something. We 
may not know, as a biological fact, what must be in someone's brain so that 
she can be said to "believe the Peace of Westphalia occurred in 1648," but 
we all know, as a basic matter of human convention, what it means when 
we say "Susan believes that the Peace of Westphalia occurred in 1648." 
Considering the success of folk psychology, most legal academics see no 
reason to abandon it. 101 Indeed, if one were to do so, one would end up with 
an unrecognizable criminal law system, devoid of mental state categories. 102 
Yet, the consciousness requirement throws a monkey wrench in the 
standard folk psychological explanation because it is far from clear how 
consciousness relates to folk psychology's categories. Consider the Model 
Penal Code's definition of murder: "criminal homicide constitutes murder 
when ... it is committed purposely or knowingly.,,103 While this makes 
sense in terms of folk psychological states of purpose and knowledge, what 
does it mean in terms of consciousness? An initial answer might be that if 
consciousness is required for culpability, then a culpable actor must have a 
purpose flow through his stream of consciousness. The exact sentence, "I 
intend to murder X," must run through the actor's head. 
It seems unlikely that culpable consciousness requires that one must, in 
fact, form sentences, either spoken or introspected in one's stream of con-
sciousness, that pick out criminal intentions; one suspects that very few, if 
any, murderers have such a sentence in their heads as they commit their 
crimes. Indeed, the sentences that run through murderers' heads as they kill 
may bear little or no resemblance to the sentence "I intend to murder X." 
97. LAFAVE & Scon, supra note 7, at 214. 
98. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
99. John D. Greenwood, Introduction to THE FuTURE OF THE FOLK PSYCHOLOGY I (John D. 
Greenwood ed., 1991). 
100. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
IO!. Ronald J. Allen, Common Sense, Rationality, and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1417,1427 (2001) ("[F)olk psychology and naive realism are mainstays of the law."). 
102. For an examination of a criminal law without intention, see Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, 
Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience & the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471 (1993). 
103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (1962). 
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Remember Floria Tosca who said "Questo e il bacio di Tosca!" (translation: 
"This is Tosca's kiss!") as she stabbed away.l04 Certainly she intended to 
murder Scarpia, yet the sentence "This is Tosca's kiss!" bears little syntactic 
similarity to the sentence "I knowingly stab Scarpia!" 
Obviously, having a mental state like purpose or knowledge means 
more than saying or thinking sentences. But what? The dominant trend in 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science is to view mental states as "pro-
positional attitudes"-relationships between attitudes like knowledge, de-
sire, and purpose and propositions like "Henry VIII was a king of England," 
"a tuna sandwich on rye," and "kill Scarpia," respectively. lOS The advantage 
of propositional attitudes, and certainly a reason why functionalism relies 
upon them, is that they provide a solution to the mind-body problem be-
cause they have a foot in both the physical and nonphysical world. On one 
hand, they are attitudes that clearly have physical expressions. "Desiring" 
can be easily defined as a cluster of behaviors. If one desires to kill Scarpia, 
one will engage in certain behaviors. One might grab at the nearest available 
carving knife, thrust the knife into Scarpia's belly, and say things like "This 
is Tosca's kiss!" On the other hand, "killing Scarpia" is a proposition until it 
is, in fact, performed. It is a concept, like a number, that has no physical 
reality. Conceiving of mental states as propositional attitudes relates physi-
cal things to abstract things-behaviors and tendencies to propositions. 
Propositional attitudes do not connect having a particular mental state to 
the existence of a particular sentence in the mind. Sentences, whether spo-
ken, written, or introspected, are related to propositions because they "point 
out," or are "used to ascribe" propositions.106 There are an infinite number 
of sentences that can point to a proposition. When a jury finds that Tosca 
knowingly killed Scarpia, it determines that Tosca's brain bore a particular 
attitude (purpose) to the proposition picked out by the sentence "Kill Scar-
pia with the carving knife." 
104. Puccini's opera, Tosca, tells the tale of the beautiful singer, Aoria Tosca. See MILTON CROSS, 
COMPLETE STORIES OF THE GREAT OPERAS 581-586 (1952). The evil head of the Roman secret police, 
Baron Scarpia, has imprisoned her lover, Mario Cavaradossi, for his liberal political agitation. Scarpia 
promises Tosca that if she will give herself to him, he will release Mario. Tosca agrees, but as Scarpia 
lecherously approaches to take his part of his bargain, Tosca picks up a conveniently placed carving 
knife and mortally wounds Scarpia as she cries "Questo e il bacio di Toscaf' 
105. REY, supra note 58, at 19; Jerry Fodor, Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation, in THE 
FuTuRE OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY 22, 23 (John D. Greenwood ed., 1993) ("The contemporary discussion 
about mental representation is intimately and intricately involved with the question of Realism about 
propositional attitudes."). 
106. "Propositions are not to be confused with facts ... [facts] are the state of affairs which true 
propositions somehow signify, name, or describe." AC. GRAYLING, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL 
LoGIC 17 (1997); MARK RICHARD, PROPOSITIONAL ATTITlJDES: AN ESSAY ON THOUGHTS AND How WE 
ASCRIBE THEM 102 .. {)3 (1990) ("[Wlhen I say, 'So and so believes that Twain is dead', and thereby say 
something true, the t-clause helps pick out the associated [mental or psychological] state. It does this by 
naming something that is, or characterizes, the cognitive content of the state ... my sentence is true provided 
that so and so is in the state thus picked out ... "). 
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B. Consciousness & Propositional Attitudes 
We began by asking what mental states are and answered that they are 
propositional attitudes. If consciousness of mental state is required for cul-
pability, how can we be conscious of our propositional attitudes? Ned 
Block's distinction between consciousness-a ("access consciousness") and 
consciousness-p ("phenomenological consciousness") points to an an-
swer.107 Consciousness-a is fairly straightforward. If you have conscious-
ness-a of X, you have "access" to X and can report upon X. Thus, con-
sciousness-a allows for rational control of action and speech, and permits us 
to represent our beliefs and desires and act upon them.108 There is nothing 
too mysterious about consciousness-a. Computers are conceivably con-
scious-a of the various sentences in their memory chips. Any entity that 
could retrieve data or images arguably has consciousness-a of such data or 
images. 109 
Consciousness-~, on the other hand, cannot be defined "in any remotely 
non circular way."ll It is the mysterious aspect of consciousness. It is the 
experience of how tasting a glass of wine, reflecting upon a painting, or 
talking to oneself "feels to oneself."lll As Block states, "[t]he totality of the 
experiential properties of a state are 'what it is like' to have it .... [W]e 
have P-consciousness states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. 
P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of ... thoughts, 
107. Ned Block, On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness, in THE NATURE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 375, 385-86 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). Block's tenni-
nology has proven quite influential. It is not completely novel with him. Many have recognized that one 
can be conscious of a propositional attitude in two ways: thinking a sentence that expresses such attitude 
and being able to produce such an intention. As Anscombe might say, "intentional actions include those to 
whose description the question 'why?' applies." Included in these are movements not considered by the agent, 
though he can say what they are ifhedoes consider them. G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 91 (1963); see also 
DENNETT, CONTENT, supra note 55, at 153 (1969). 
108. Block, supra note 107, at 385-86. 
109. While the distinction between consciousness-a and consciousness-p has wide support among 
philosophers and cognitive scientists, not all agree. For instance, Dennett claims that "the varieties of 
consciousness [Block] thinks he sees falling under P-consciousness and A-consciousness can all be 
accommodated under the two rough quantitative headings of richness of content and degree of influ-
ence." Daniel C. Dennett, The Path Not Taken, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL 
DEBATES 417, 417 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). Forthose who would follow Dennett, the Article's use 
of consciousness-a and consciousness-p can simply be recast as consciousness that is either more rich or 
less rich. 
110. Block, supra note 106, at 380. 
III. Thomas Nagel famously described consciousness-p when he asked whether human beings can 
ever know "what it is like to be a bat." Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in THE NATURE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 519 (Ned Block et al. eds., 1997). 
As he points out, we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat and to echolocate (bats' radar-like 
capacity by which they orient themselves through sensing the pattern of bounced sound waves) because 
"imagining additions to [one's] present experience, or ... imaging segments gradually subtracted from 
it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications" are simply "inade-
quate to the task." Id. Being a bat involves a mode of representation that is inconceivable to human 
beings. We can have no idea how representing the world through echolocation "feels." For a more ex-
haustive analysis of the philosophical implications of Nagel's subjective reality, see THOMAS NAGEL, 
THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986). 
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wants, and emotions.,,112 Another way to describe consciousness-p is as the 
"global workspace," a focus through which all of an actor's desires and be-
liefs can interact. ll3 Baars describes consciousness-p as a theater in which a 
variety of "expert systems" converge, the place in which retrieved images, 
retrieved memories, and words interact, and conscious problem solving and 
practical reasoning occur. 114 
Human beings can access and report on their propositional attitudes 
and, therefore, can be said to be conscious-a of them. It is also possible for 
human beings to have consciousness-p of propositional attitudes. This oc-
curs when they appear in our stream of consciousness, when we introspect 
or verbalize them, or "think in words."ll5 Which does the criminal law re-
quire? What type of consciousness renders an actor culpable? 
On one hand, it would seem that the law only requires consciousness-a. 
This is because we almost always have access to our beliefs, desires, and 
intentions and are therefore culpable for them. More importantly, if con-
sciousness-p were required, then actors would only be culpable for those 
few actions that are ever performed in consciousness-po People do not go 
around saying to themselves or others, "Now I will take a step," or "Now I 
will pull a trigger," or even "Questo la bacio di Tosca!" 
On the other hand, the problem of dissociate or highly traumatic states 
suggests that consciousness-p is required for culpability. As discussed in the 
Introduction, the unconscious or somnambulistic murderer could conceiva-
bly answer questions about what he or she was doing (and therefore have 
consciousness-a), yet most jurisdictions would hold such an actor inno-
cent. ll6 Similarly, even individuals under extreme emotional or physical 
distress generally can report on what they are doing. For instance, in the 
famous case of People V. Newton,117 Huey Newton, the renowned political 
activist, claimed that after being shot in the abdomen by a policeman, he 
"unconsciously" responded in kind. lls If someone were present at the inci-
112. Block, supra note 107, at 380. 
113. Bernard J. Baars, Contrastive Phenomenology: A Thoroughly Empirical Approach to Con-
sciousness, in THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 187, 189 (Ned Block et al. 
eds., 1997). 
114. [d. at 189. 
115. Eric Lonnand provides a useful taxonomy of consciousness-p, specifying a "quartet" of types of 
consciousness-po 
For many conscious states, there is clearly something it's like for us to have them: 
(i) conscious perceptual representations, such as tastings and visual experiences, 
(ii) conscious bodily sensations, such as pains, tickles and itches, 
(iii) conscious imaginings, such as those of one's own actions or perceptions and 
(iv) conscious streams (or trains) of thought, as in thinking 'in words' or 'in images.' 
Eric Lonnand, Nonphenomenal Consciousness, 30 NOOs 242-261 (1996). Lonnand concludes that we 
are not conscious-p of propositional attitudes, which we possess but are not present in streams of 
thought. Legal mental state is concerned with the fourth category. 
116. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 406 P.2d 43, 52 (Cal. 1956); Lewis V. State, 27 S.E.2d 659, 661 
(Ga. 1943); People V. Dunigan, 421 N.E.2d 1319, 1336 (lll. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Magnus, 155 
N.Y.S. lOB, 1014 (N.Y. Gen. Tenn 1915); Commonwealth V. Crosby, 279 A.2d 73, 76 (Pa. 1971). 
117. 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Cal. App. 1970). 
118. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 403. 
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dent and asked the incapacitated Newton, "What are you doing?" he may 
have responded, "I'm shooting the policeman." It is clear then that criminal 
actors can have consciousness-a, but not be criminally liable. I 19 
There seems to be an impasse. If consciousness-p cannot possibly form 
the basis for criminal liability, why should it matter when actors like Huey 
Newton cannot bring their intentions into a complete consciousness-p? The 
answer to this conundrum lies in the realization that we can only be held 
culpable for those intentions that we can reasonably be expected to access 
given the circumstances. Under most circumstances, we can access the in-
tentions that concern our actions. Consciousness-a implies consciousness-c. 
Just as, under Wallace's argument, actors have moral responsibility if they 
have the ability to exert "reflective self-control," under consciousness-c, 
actors have responsibility if they have the ability to bring culpable inten-
tions into consciousness-po There are, however, times when human beings 
simply cannot be expected to have a complete inventory of their mind's 
content. Under sufficiently traumatic situations, the law excuses an actor 
from consciously comprehending her actions in consciousness-p.120 
By requiring relatively easy access in consciousness-p for culpability, 
consciousness-c reflects the strong notion that consciousness-p is the hall-
mark of personal identity. An actor is "present" when he can consider an 
action in consciousness-po Actors who lack culpability because of a lack of 
consciousness, like hypnotics or somnambulists, have consciousness-a. If 
asked, they could provide reasons or justifications for their actions. How-
ever, even if they were to respond in a dream-like voice, "I intend to murder 
X," they would not be culpable because their consciousness-p was compro-
mised. Their spoken or introspected intention would not have been "heard" 
by their true consciousness because their consciousness-p was impaired. 
There does not appear to be a further justification for making con-
sciousness-p a requirement for personal identity. It is almost a matter of 
definition; as Locke said, consciousness is required for personhood. 121 
While not expressing a view on the matter, it seems at least possible that 
treating consciousness-p as the hallmark of personhood is a culturally de-
termined position. Other types of consciousness could define personhood, 
and some have argued that in the ancient past individuals did understand 
consciousness and personhood in radically different ways. 122 
We can now define what it means to have consciousness-c of a particu-
lar intention. Consider the somnambulist who, upon waking, recalls his in-
tention that accompanied his act to murder his wife. Such an actor, though 
he arguably "had" the intention to murder, could not have reasonably 
119. See id. at 405-06. 
120. See WALLACE, supra note 6, § 6.2. 
121. loCKE, supra note 81, at 466-67. 
122. See JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BICAMERAL 
MIND 149-313 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1990) (1976). For speculation along similar lines see HAROLD 
BLOOM, SHAKESPEARE: THE INVENTION OF THE HUMAN 741 (1998), arguing that the plays of Shake-
speare created the modem concept of personality. 
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brought the intention to consciousness-p; we do not expect sleeping people 
to be fully aware of their actions. Because the somnambulist does not have 
that ability, he could not be said to have grasped that criminal intention. To 
use Wallace's terms, he lacked part of his reflective self-control that could 
directly influence his actions.123 Like Wallace's requirement for general 
culpability, namely that actors must have the ability to deliberate about and 
be influenced by reasons, consciousness-c requires that, in order for an actor 
to be said to act with a particular criminal intention, he must have the ability 
to deliberate about and be influenced by such criminal intention.124 He need 
not deliberate about such intention, but he must have the ability to do so. 
Consciousness-c clarifies the various "freakish" cases involving som-
nambulists and comatose individuals that have challenged courts and com-
mentators to justify why defendants in these cases lack culpability. Som-
nambulists and comatose individuals cannot be reasonably expected to bring 
criminal intentions into their standard consciousness-po Similarly, one need 
not make claims about whether the unconscious actor can comprehend the 
nature and quality of his act,125 lacks knowledge of the deed,126 or can form 
an intention. 127 Regardless of whether the actor knew the nature of his act or 
could recall it, all would agree that at the time the act was performed, his 
knowledge about the act could not influence his actions in a way that would 
permit reflective self-contro1.128 
Consciousness-p, therefore, agrees with the courts that speak about un-
consciousness as depriving an actor of the power of choice. A choice for 
which actors bear responsibility requires (i) the powers of reflective control 
(the ability to be directly influenced by reason) and (ii) the power to conduct 
such reflection in the actor's normal consciousness-po Unconscious actors 
cannot choose because it is not clear whether one can reflect in the uncon-
scious. Further, even if you allowed some sort of dynamic unconsciousness, 
such reflection would not "belong" to actors under accepted notions of per-
sonhood if it were not accessible in their normal consciousness-po 
Finally, consciousness-c contains a normative content. When we speak 
of the ability to bring reason or intention into consciousness, the ability is 
always relative to the circumstances. Under most circumstances, although 
we do not think to ourselves, "Now I will take a step, now another, now I 
will shoot my tennis opponent," we have the ability to bring those intentions 
into consciousness-po Thus, as stated above, consciousness-a is generally 
equivalent to consciousness-po Under other conditions, it is more difficult to 
equate the two. 
123. See WALLACE, supra note 6, § 6.2. 
124. Id. 
125. See Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351, 358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962). 
126. See People v. Higgins, 159 N.E.2d 179, 184 (N.Y. 1959). 
127. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. 
128. See WALLACE, supra note 6, § 6.2. 
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Some intentions or reasons are easy to access-they exist on the tips of 
our tongues. Others require a moment of reflection-the husband who pulls 
back his hand as he is about to hit his wife and then cries, "My G-d, what 
am I doing?" Still others may require waking from a trance or psychoanaly-
sis to access. The question of what actors could potentially access has dif-
ferent answers under different conditions. We expect actors under some 
conditions to have greater cognitive awareness than under other conditions. 
In everyday life, we would expect that actors should be able to access the 
intentions for their actions. When actors are in trances, we would not expect 
them to have such access. When actors have a known history of sleepwalk-
ing and attempting murder while doing so, we might expect them to gain 
consciousness of their murderous intentions through some sort of watcher or 
alarm clock. 
This normative judgment-how much cognitive awareness we expect 
under a given condition or circumstance-yields more interesting results in 
crimes that involve gradations of consciousness, like first- and second-
degree murder. These two classifications of murder will be discussed in the 
next Part. . 
III. FIRST- AND SECOND-DEGREE MURDER 
Over the last few centuries, courts have developed more gradations of 
mental state for homicide than for any other crime. There is first-degree 
murder, which is intentional but requires "premeditation," and second-
degree murder, which is also intentional but does not require "premedita-
tion.,,129 Then there is voluntary manslaughter, which is "the intentional 
killing of a human being in the sudden heat of passion resulting from a suf-
ficient legal provocation,,,130 though some courts claim that the heat of pas-
sion destroys the intention. 131 There is also involuntary manslaughter, or 
negligent homicide, which is not an intentional crime at all.132 These mental 
state gradations have spawned a prodigious heritage of legal confusion. 
Perhaps most difficult of all has been the distinction between first- and 
second-degree murder. 133 The distinction has its roots in the statutory re-
form of common law murder, a reform that began in the eighteenth century 
with The Pennsylvania Act of 1794.134 This statute provided that "all murder, 
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any 
kind of wilful [sic], deliberate and premeditated killing ... shall be deemed 
129. Russ, supra note 15, at 962-63. 
130. State v. Nichols, 481 S.E.2d 118, 122 (S.c. 1997). 
131. LAFAVE & SCO'IT, supra note 7, § 7.10 at 254 ("[Tjhe passion must be so great as to destroy the 
intent to kill, in order to accomplish the reduction of the homicide to voluntary manslaughter."). 
132. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, § 31.10[Dj, at 544 (3d ed. 2001) ("A 
criminally negligent homicide-{isj involuntary manslaughter at common law .... "). 
133. See Pauley, supra note 9, at 161 ("Courts have had considerable difficulty with the premedita-
tion formula for first degree murder-difficulty in defining the term, in sticking to one definition of it, 
and in applying that definition clearly and consistently."). 
134. 1794 Pa. Laws ch. 257. 
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murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be deemed mur-
der in the second degree.,,\35 The Pennsylvania codification became a model 
for most states. 136 The majority of states continue to have degrees. 137 Under the 
standard formulation, first-degree murder requires "willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated" action, while second-degree murder only requires intentional 
action. 138 Cases that explicate first-degree murder usually interpret premedita-
tion as actual reflection. 139 First-degree murder requires "coolness, calm reflec-
tion."l40 
The problem that has plagued the distinction between fIrst- and second-
degree murder is practical. How much premeditation is required? If pre-
meditation can occur a second before--or even simultaneous with-the act, 
then first-degree murder collapses into second-degree murder. The only 
difference between the two crimes becomes a tiny blip in the stream of con-
sciousness. A thought can hover in consciousness-a and can be highly de:-
terminative of action, yet never enter consciousness-po Why should liability 
be different in these two cases? 
As a result of this problem, sometimes courts eliminate the requirement 
for deliberation in consciousness-p, as in State V. Schrader, 141 which con-
cluded that "what is really meant by the language 'willful, deliberate and 
premeditated' ... is that the killing be intentional.,,142 On the other extreme, 
in People V. Anderson143 the California Supreme Court read premeditation 
to mean not only premeditated thought but careful planning as well. l44 
This problem has led most commentators to reject the distinction. Nota-
bly, Benjamin Cardozo recognized this confusion early in the twentieth cen-
tury. "To deliberate and premeditate within the meaning of the statute, one 
does not have to plan the murder days or hours or even minutes in advance. 
. . . The law does not say that an~ particular length of time must intervene 
between the volition and the act." 45 It is a fine distinction that, as Dan Den-
135. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b) at 123 (1980) (citing 1794 Pa. Laws ch. 257, §§ 1,2). 
136. Pauley, supra note 9, at 146. 
137. [d. at 146; see also DRESSLER, supra note 132, § 31.03[C][I], at 508. 
138. People V. Thomas, 156 P.2d 7, 18 (Cal. 1945); Russ, supra note IS, at 963 ("Despite the criti-
cism of legal commentators, many courts continue to speak in terms of malice "aforethought," "premedi-
tation," "deliberation," and the like, in defining first-degree murder."). For criticism of recent efforts at 
reform, see Hobson, supra note IS, at517. 
139. Thomas, 156 P.2d at 7, 18 (stating that premeditation requires "substantially more reflection 
than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill"); Baker v. State, 632 A.2d 783, 
794 (Md. 1993) ("Premeditated means that the defendant thought about the killing and that there was 
time ... to form the intent to kill."); State v. Guthrie, 461 S.E.2d 163, 182 (W. Va. 1995) (First-degree 
murder is "a ruthless, cold-blooded, calculating killing. Any other intentional killing, by its spontaneous 
and nonreflective nature, is second degree murder."). 
140. Pauley, supra note 9, at 154 (setting forth the Schrader/Anderson dichotomy). 
141. 302 S.E.2d 70 (W. Va. 1982). 
142. Schrader, 302 S.E.2d at 75. 
143. 447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968). 
144. Anderson,447 P.2d at 949. 
145. Cardozo has stated: 
I think the distinction [between first- and second-degree murder] is much too vague to be 
continued in our law .... The presence of a sudden impulse is said to mark the dividing line, 
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nett might argue, so stretches verifiability that it cannot be treated as a real 
empirical fact. 146 Compare the actor who correctly remembered premeditat-
ing murder with the actor who remembered premeditating a murder that did 
not occur. How could the law distinguish the two? Similarly, would it be 
fair to convict a defendant of first-degree murder who did premeditate, but 
honestly fails to remember, the premeditation? 
Beyond questioning the evidentiary basis for the distinction, legal 
commentators have questioned its moral justifications for more than a cen-
tury. Representing mainstream legal thought, the Model Penal Code's draft-
ers argued that "judicial inconsistency and obscurity are largely sympto-
matic of the lack of an intelligible policy underlying the" degree classifica-
tion. 147 The drafters rejected dividing murder into degrees because the gen-
eralization "that the person who plans ahead is worse than the person who 
kills on sudden impulse" is not sound. 148 While it is the case that some kill-
ers who reflect beforehand are in fact more blameworthy than some who 
kill impUlsively, it is also the case that some who kill impulsively are, in 
fact, more blameworthy than some reflective killers. 149 
Consciousness-c questions these conclusions. Clearly, if consciousness 
is required for culpability, and if consciousness is a continuum, then greater 
consciousness entails greater culpability. The justification for this argument, 
as discussed supra, rests firmly upon our notions of choice and person-
hood. 15o Premeditation is perhaps the classic example of consciousness in 
which "all of you" is present. It involves the presentation of one's beliefs, 
desires, and intentions in consciousness-p that, as discussed supra, are the 
hallmark of personal identity, providing the focus where presumably all of 
one's beliefs, desires, and intentions can interact. 151 Not surprisingly, first-
degree murder carries the greatest punishment. 152 
The current degree murder formulation assumes that only premeditated 
murder involves the most heightened type of consciousness in which all of 
one's beliefs, desires, and intentions can come into play and influence be-
havior. Consciousness-c questions this assumption. Consciousness impli-
cates culpability because only in consciousness can it be said that reflective 
self-control occurs. Consciousness-c points out that intentions that are easily 
brought into consciousness-p can exert the same degree of influence and 
"reflective control" over behavior as those actually in consciousness-po Pro-
vided it is reasonable to expect an actor to call his culpable intention into 
but how can an impulse be anything but sudden when the time for its formation is measured 
by the lapse of seconds? 
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, What Medicine Can dolor Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OrHER ESSAYS 
AND ADDRESSES 70, at 97-99 (Harcourt, Bruce & Co. 1938) (\931). 
146. DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 182-87 (1991). 
147. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cm!. at 126 (1980). 
148. [d. § 210.6 cmt. at 127. 
149. See id. § 210.6 cm!. at 127-28. 
150. See discussion supra at Part II.B. 
151. See discussion supra at Part II.B. 
152. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980). 
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consciousness-p, there is cUlpability. Actual presentation in consciousness is 
simply not necessary. Premeditated intentions, therefore, are morally 
equivalent to those intentions that reasonably could be brought into con-
sciousness. 
Consciousness-c would greatly expand first-degree murder. It would no 
longer include only premeditated murder, but also murder in which we 
would expect an actor to premeditate. This expansion easily answers the 
Model Penal Code's rejection of the murder degree distinctions. The Code 
reasons that because the person who plans ahead is not necessarily worse 
than the person who kills on sudden impulse, premeditation should not be 
an issue in murder. Consciousness-c responds that premeditation itself does 
not make an actor more blameworthy. But the reasonable expectation to 
premeditate-to bring to consciousness-p and think about it-indeed makes 
an actor more culpable. The Code could only refute consciousness-c by 
arguing that consciousness is irrelevant to culpability, which it explicitly 
does not do. To the contrary, the Code recognizes that consciousness is es-
sential to culpability. 153 
Consider the example of the cold-blooded murderer who simply walks 
by a child sitting on a bridge and pushes the child off the bridge without 
thinking or deliberating, forwarded by a famous foe of the premeditation 
doctrine. 154 Under consciousness-c, an actor who reasonably could be ex-
pected to deliberate upon his intention-such as the child-pusher-would be 
just as culpable as if he had premeditated. Consciousness-c, therefore, pre-
serves the obvious notion that increased consciousness increases culpabil-
ity-a point that the Model Penal Code's drafters unconvincingly try to 
refute. Consciousness-c accommodates the Code's drafters' correct observa-
tion that premeditation itself does not necessarily make an intentional kill-
ing any worse than another intentional killing. 
Consciousness-c, of course, resolves the evidentiary and conceptual dis-
tinction between first- and second-degree murder that Judge Cardozo found 
to be "a mystifying cloud of words ... [that] is so obscure that no jury hear-
ing it for the first time can fairly be expected to assimilate and understand 
it.,,155 Cardozo understood the distinction as "merely a privilege offered to 
the jury to find the lesser degree when the suddenness of the intent, the ve-
hemence of the passion, seems to call irresistibly for the exercise of 
mercy.,,156 Under consciousness-c, actions that result from a sudden or ve-
hement passion would be analyzed by the degree to which such passion 
would alter our expectations that an actor could reasonably bring an inten-
tion into consciousness-po 
153. The Model Penal Code finds that unconscious acts cannot render the actor morally culpable, but 
its reasoning is unsound. The Code claims that unconscious acts are not "voluntary acts." MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.01(2)(b) (1985). 
154. 3 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 94 (1883). 
ISS. CARDOZO, supra note 145, at 100. 
156. Id. 
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This normative content of consciousness-c is, as Cardozo might say, an 
exercise of mercy, for it realizes that under some circumstances, as in the 
case of sleepwalkers, it is very difficult to bring an action into conscious-
ness-po Under those circumstances, one's capacity for reflective control is 
highly compromised; we would have no expectation that human beings 
would deliberate about their actions. Without such an expectation, actors 
cannot be faulted for failing to do so. 
Consider this example: 
Two men have a heated argument while drinking. A knife happens 
to be on the table. One man picks up the knife and stabs the other. 
Under the traditional model, the defendant could argue that only 
voluntary manslaughter was involved, particularly if there was no 
physical battery or other similar provocation. However, if only a 
verbal altercation occurred, which is not adequate provocation un-
der the laws of most states, the prosecution would probably seek a 
higher penalty.157 Similarly, if the state followed the Model Penal 
Code-type distinctions, the defendant could claim "extreme emo-
tional distress," but again, that would be difficult given that the ar-
gument was only verbal. 15S 
Because voluntary manslaughter would not be available, the defendant 
would likely be charged with either first- or second-degree murder. The 
question would be whether the defendant was guilty of first- or second-
degree murder, a question that turns on whether, during the time preceding 
the attack, culpable thoughts passed through the defendant's stream of con-
sciousness. The jury would have to peer through Cardozo's "cloud of 
words" to determine what premeditation means, and then determine whether 
the defendant premeditated-a difficult and intractable question which, 
more often than not, would simply be guess work. 159 
On the other hand, consciousness-c simply asks the jury, given that the 
action was intentional (the defendant had consciousness-a of his murderous 
intention), we would expect him, under the circumstances, to exhibit a 
higher level of reflective control. The jury could consider all factors rea-
sonably related to our expectations. These factors might include the length 
of time during which the actor could deliberate, the nature of the fight-
whether it was provocative enough to render cognition or reflection, more 
157. Commonwealth v. Masello, 702 N.E.2d 1153, 1155 (1998) (stating that even a heated argument 
does not "constitute adequate provocation" warranting a voluntary manslaughter instruction); see also 
LAFAVE & SCOIT, supra note 7, § 7.10 at 657. 
158. See State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 508 A,2d 167 (N.J. 1986) (holding that absence of any evi-
dence in the record of "passion" or extreme emotional disturbance coupled with very slight evidence of 
provocation, consisting of verbal abuse and an attempt to strike the defendant, warranted denial of a 
passion or provocation jury charge). 
159. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 326 n.249 (1996) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN Do FOR 
LAW 27 (1930)). 
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difficult though not enough, to warrant a complete manslaughter-
provocation defense-the extent of drinking, or whether the defendant had a 
history of drinking or violence and should have known its effects. 
N. NORMATIVE JUDGMENTS: 
CONSCIOUSNESS & MOTIVATION 
Numerous scholars have asserted recently that the law, Ptarticularly the 
law of murder, contains unrecognized moral judgments. 60 Kahan and 
Nussbaum have argued that the law contains judgments about actors' moti-
vations. 161 They criticize various doctrines in the criminal law because the 
"prevailing explanations of these doctrines are inadequate £recisely because 
they overlook the influence of the evaluative conception.,,1 2 
Kahan and Nussbaum argue that we judge people largely by their moti-
vations, not simply by whether they follow a rule. 163 This general insight is 
uncontroversial. Actors whose motives are considered "good" or "noble" 
receive more lenient treatment than those with baser motives. Many, for 
instance, consider the physician mercy-killer morally superior to the hit 
man, though both commit murders that are equally premeditated. During 
sentencing, judges often consider motivation. l64 Kahan and Nussbaum argue 
that the law's hidden judgments concerning motivating emotions should be 
made more explicit, even reflected, in legislation or sentencing practices. 165 
They claim that this explicit recognition will make the doctrine of premedi-
tated murder clearer. 16 While a complete refutation of their position re-
quires a defense of act-based criminal law, a task well beyond this Article's 
scope, the following briefly discusses differences between consciousness-c 
and Kahan and Nussbaum's proposal, and suggests that consciousness-c 
may offer a more coherent reform. 
As a starting point, Kahan and Nussbaum claim that the distinction be-
tween fIrst- and second-degree murder is "one of the great fIctions of the 
law.,,167 They claim that the distinction is fIctitious because "[m]any juris-
dictions do not require any evidence of advance planning or thought to es-
tablish [premeditation].,,168 In many jurisdictions, premeditation can occur 
in an instant because "no time is too short ... for a wicked man to frame in 
160. See. e.g .• id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 301. 
163. Id. at 359. 
164. See. e.g .• U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Al.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulner-
able Victim) (Nov. 2000). 
165. Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 159. at 372-73. 
166. Id.at371-72. 
167. See id. at 324. 
168. Id. 
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his mind his scheme of murder. ... ,,169 Following Cardozo, they find the 
distinction simply too fine to be meaningful. 17o 
That claim is tendentious. Just because premeditation can exist in a 
moment-the sentence that picks out the propositional attitude that reflects 
a criminal intention can enter consciousness-p in a moment--does not mean 
that distinctions that rely upon this phenomenon are fictitious. They may 
present fine evidentiary issues, as Cardozo argues, or are perhaps unverifi-
able to the point of meaninglessness, as Dennett might argue. But they are 
not fictitious. 
In comparison, consciousness-c agrees that there are unrecognized 
moral distinctions between first- and second-degree murder but does not 
believe the distinction is fictional. The distinction is real and reflects the 
judgment that those with increased consciousness are more culpable. Con-
sciousness-c argues that premeditation is simply an underinclusive category 
for crimes committed in "heightened consciousness" and first- and second-
degree murder should be reformed to better reflect this distinction. The dif-
ficulty that the distinction has created stems from, as Cardozo recognizes, 
its evidentiary challenges-who can tell when an actor premeditates?171 
Naturally, this difficulty has led to confusion. As discussed above, however, 
consciousness-c, an explicit moral judgment, eliminates this confusion. 
Let us grant, arguendo, that the distinction is indeed fictional. To Kahan 
and Nussbaum the distinction's fiction is not a criticism, but a strength. 
They assert, "the fictional conception of premeditation is in fact perfectly 
coherent under the evaluative view.,,172 Under their evaluative view, pre-
meditated murder can be defended on the grounds that it is a "passionless" 
killing, which is more morally repugnant than a murder committed "when 
not motivated by a strong emotional valuation.,,173 This, however, is an 
overbroad generalization. Premeditated murder includes more than the cold, 
calculating murderer. Those who murder under strong emotion-not the 
type of emotion that would warrant prosecution for voluntary manslaugh-
ter--can be prosecuted for premeditated murder. 174 Therefore, under the 
traditional formulation, premeditated murder need not be cool and calcu-
lated. Rather, "heated" premeditation, falling short of legally sufficient 
provocation, constitutes first-degree murder. 175 
Fundamentally, consciousness-c suggests that the moral justification for 
treating premeditation as a more evil crime is not, as Kahan and Nussbaum 
would argue, the moral judgment that passionless killing is worse than emo-
169. [d. 
170. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 159, at 325-27. 
171. [d. at 325-26. 
172. [d. at 325. 
173. [d. 
174. Under common law, voluntary manslaughter was limited to a few situations, such as battery, 
mutual combat, assault, illegal arrest, and adultery. LAFAVE & SCUIT, supra note 7, § 7.10 at 655-57. 
175. [d. at 653-57. 
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tionally motivated killing. 176 Rather, premeditation rests on the considera-
tion that those who have a greater consciousness of their actions are more 
culpable. Premeditation places the maxim of one's action squarely in con-
sciousness. Actors whose moral reasoning does not kick in under such cir-
cumstances are more culpable than those who never premeditate, and 
thereby fail to present squarely their action's maxim to their powers of ra-
tional, moral control. Consciousness-c only modifies the traditional applica-
tion of this insight by pointing out that heightened consciousness is not nec-
essarily coextensive with premeditation. 
Kahan and Nussbaum further argue that premeditation, as a fiction, in-
cludes those who do not truly premeditate and functions "as a placeholder 
for the sum total of the decisonmaker's moral intuitions, which can then be 
freely brought to bear on the facts of each particular case.,,177 They invite 
legislatures and courts to punish more harshly those "types of murders ... 
[with] especially heinous emotional motivation" as first-degree murder. 178 
While a complete refutation of their position requires a defense of the 
act-based, as opposed to character-based, criminal law-something well 
beyond this Article's scope as mentioned, supra-it would be appropriate to 
voice a few tentative concerns with the Kahan-Nussbaum proposal. First, in 
the broadest terms, the difference between consciousness-c and the Kahan-
Nussbaum proposal is primarily one of time frame and control mechanism. 
Kahan and Nussbaum fault actors for those character flaws that cause their 
criminal conduct. 179 Actors should be punished not just for intending to do 
particular prohibited things, but also for their broader aims, goals, and de-
sires. Kahan and Nussbaum would have juries look to the murderers' deeper 
motivations, holding an actor liable for character flaws with deep childhood 
roots. They want actors held responsible for these flaws, and they want ac-
tors to be required to control their behavior by modifying and ameliorating 
these flaws. Consciousness-c, on the other hand, faults actors for their in-
tended acts,180 holding them responsible for failing to use their powers of 
rational control to refrain from certain acts that fall within reasonable expec-
tations of human cognitive capacity. It does not look to an actor's past life 
or future goals but simply asks to what degree was it possible for an actor to 
be conscious of the maxim of some prohibited act in a given situation. 
The narrower focus of consciousness-c is more fair and consistent with 
the view of human beings as free actors. People often have great trouble 
controlling their motivations and desires. Many of the vices associated with 
criminality, like anjer, alcoholism, and drug use, are notoriously difficult to 
control or modify. I I Indeed, we do not choose our motivations and desires 
176. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 159, at 323-27. 
177. Id. at 326. 
178. Id. at 327. 
179. See id. at 326. 
180. An action can be considered simply a willed bodily movement. MOORE, Acr & CRIME, supra 
note 20, at 126. 
181. See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, WHAT You CAN CHANGE .•. AND WHAT You CAN'T 130-31, 
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in the sense that we can choose to perform a particular action. While we can 
choose an action (i.e., a simple, voluntary bodily motion), we cannot choose 
the reason why we perform that action. On the other hand, actors, even un-
fortunate characters prone to violence or drug use, certainly have the ability 
through rational self-control to refrain from the basic prohibitions found in 
the criminal law. Most alcoholics with violent tendencies do not commit 
crimes-not because they lack impulses to do so but because they are suffi-
ciently receptive to reasons not to do so. Punishing the failure of rational 
control therefore seems much fairer, considering most people have the abil-
ity to control their behavior in accordance with reason. 
Second, while consciousness-c aims to reduce evidentiary difficulties, 
the Kahan-Nussbaum approach appears to aggravate such problems. Their 
approach would replace the confusing distinction between first- and second-
degree murder with the confusion caused by turning jurors into courtroom 
psychoanalysts, attempting to divine a defendant's motivations. Consider a 
hypothetical, which, appealing to the liberal standards of law school hy-
potheticals, hopefully will not unduly strain the reader's credulity: The same 
two men that appeared in Part IV, Mr. X and Mr. Y, are arguing and drink-
ing. During the course of the argument, Mr. X, who moonlights as a hit man, 
informs Mr. Y, the other man, that Mr. X is having an affair with Mrs. Yand 
that Mrs. Y, after helping him perform a hit, has decided to leave Mr. Yand 
begin a full-time hit-person career as Mr. X's associate. Mr. X leaves, and 
Mr. Y then murders his wife. 
Under the Kahan-Nussbaum proposal, the fact-finder would have to as-
certain Mr. Y's motivation-anger (arguably sexist and misogynistic) that 
his wife had committed adultery and was leaving him, general orneriness, 
drunkenness, or righteous indignation against premeditated murderers. This 
seems quite an order compared to consciousness-c's modest requirement: 
under the conditions, would we expect Mr. Y to have a consciousness capa-
ble of reflective control. 
Finally, Kahan and Nussbaum claim that their proposal corrects the 
first-degree, second-degree distinction's "obscure evaluation.,,182 Yet, as the 
above hypothetical suggests, determining the comparative moral worth of 
various conceivable goals motivating the defendant seems equally, if not 
more, obscure. Kahan and Nussbaum want courts to engage in a "two-
step[]" process whereby they ascertain "emotional motivations" and then 
evaluate the actor's responsibility for his character.183 They argue that juries 
determine not only what motivations inspire an action, but the myriad moti-
vations' comparative moral worth (or repulsiveness). Additionally, they 
argue that juries should determine the actor's responsibility in being the 
type of person who has such motivations. Kahan and Nussbaum realize that 
220-21 (1993) ("I'm not sure [anger can be changed] ... the problem [of alcoholism and drug abuse] is 
certainly not incurable. but the outlook is not rosy."). 
182. See Kahan & Nussbaum. supra note 159. at 325-27. 
183. [d. at 367. 
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their position is open to the objection that it creates an awkwardly complex 
decisional structure, but dismiss the objection as "obtuse," arguing that 
moral decisions are complex. 184 
In its simplicity, consciousness-c differs from the Kahan-Nussbaum ap-
proach. It does not ask courts to determine the moral worth of each defen-
dant's character. Rather, it assumes that the criminal law only prohibits acts 
of such egregiousness that they are blameworthy if committed by virtually 
any actor under any motivation. Under consciousness-c murder is virtually 
always evil, save in those extreme situations that arguably prove the rule. 185 
Consciousness-c's moral judgment is quite confined, asking courts only 
whether the circumstances warrant a lower expectation of the defendant's 
reflective control to follow a rule. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has (1) argued that consciousness, not having or acting with 
a particular mental state, is the correct condition for culpability; (2) de-
fended consciousness as culpability's sine qua non because it-and not 
mere possession of mental state-is required for personal identity and re-
sponsibility; (3) defined the level of consciousness that is required for cul-
pability-consciousness-c; and (4) showed how consciousness-c provides a 
clearer understanding of first-degree murder. The application of conscious-
ness-c is not limited to elucidating the degrees of murder. It can be used in 
various other problems in the law, like voluntary manslaughter and corpo-
rate criminality. 186 
184. [d. 
185. The famous case of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens stands as an exception that proves the rule. 
Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884), reprinted in part in STEPHEN H. KADISH & 
STEPHEN S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 114 (5th ed. 1989). In that case, several 
castaways in an open boat, including Dudley and Stephens, agreed after solemn deliberation that their 
survival required killing a sick, delirious companion, who was clearly near death anyway, and consum-
ing his body. Dudley and Stephens arguably committed a mercy killing for the best reasons-saving 
other lives. A difficult case, and perhaps a situation for mercy-though arguably not, as the reviewing 
court upheld their convictions. The case shows, at the very least, the extremes to which we must go to 
find a situation in which worthy motivations could render murder in consciousness-c morally acceptable. 
186. Adam Candeub, Corporate Consciousness and Corporate Culpability (Sept. 15,2(02) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
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